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Abstract—To date, most studies on spam have focused only
on the spamming phase of the spam cycle and have ignored
the harvesting phase, which consists of the mass acquisition of
email addresses. It has been observed that spammers conceal
their identity to a lesser degree in the harvesting phase, so it
may be possible to gain new insights into spammers’ behavior
by studying the behavior of harvesters, which are individuals or
bots that collect email addresses. In this paper, we reveal social
networks of spammers by identifying communities of harvesters
with high behavioral similarity using spectral clustering. The data
analyzed was collected through Project Honey Pot, a distributed
system for monitoring harvesting and spamming. Our main
findings are (1) that most spammers either send only phishing
emails or no phishing emails at all, (2) that most communities
of spammers also send only phishing emails or no phishing
emails at all, and (3) that several groups of spammers within
communities exhibit coherent temporal behavior and have similar
IP addresses. Our findings reveal some previously unknown
behavior of spammers and suggest that there is indeed social
structure between spammers to be discovered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Previous studies on spam have mostly focused on studying
its content or its source. Likewise, currently used anti-spam
methods mostly involve filtering emails based on their content
or by their email server IP address. More recently, there
have been studies on the network-level behavior of spammers
[1], [2]. However, very little attention has been devoted to
studying how spammers acquire the email addresses that they
send spam to, a process commonly referred to as harvesting.
Harvesting is the first phase of the spam cycle; sending the
spam emails to the acquired addresses is the second phase.
Spammers send spam emails using spam servers, which are
typically compromised computers or open proxies, both of
which allow spammers to hide their identities. On the other
hand, it has been observed that spammers do not make the
same effort to conceal their identities during the harvesting
phase [3], indicating that harvesters, which are individuals or
bots that collect email addresses, are closely related to the
spammers who are sending the spam emails. The harvester and
spam server are the two intermediaries in the path of spam,
illustrated in Fig. 1.
In this paper we try to reveal social networks of spammers
by identifying communities of harvesters using data from both
phases of the spam cycle. The source of the data analyzed in
this paper is Project Honey Pot [4], a web-based network for
monitoring harvesting and spamming activity by using trap
Fig. 1. The path of spam: from an email address on a web page to a
recipient’s inbox.
email addresses. For every spam email received at a trap email
address, the Project Honey Pot data set provides us with the
IP address of the harvester that acquired the recipient’s email
address in addition to the IP address of the spam server, which
is contained in the header of the email. Spammers make use of
both harvesters and spam servers in order to distribute emails
to recipients, but the IP address of the harvester that acquired
the recipient’s email address is typically unknown; it is only
through Project Honey Pot that we are able to uncover it. The
Project Honey Pot data set is described in detail in Section II.
Project Honey Pot happens to be an ideal data source for
studying phishing emails. Phishing is an attempt to fraudu-
lently acquire sensitive information by appearing to represent
a trustworthy entity. It is impossible for a trap email address to,
for example, sign up for a PayPal account, so all emails sup-
posedly received from financial institutions can immediately
be classified as phishing emails. We investigate the prevalence
of phishing emails and their distribution among harvesters.
We look for community structure within the network of
harvesters by partitioning harvesters into groups such that
the harvesters in each group exhibit high behavioral simi-
larity. This is a clustering problem, and we adopt a method
commonly referred to as spectral clustering. Identifying com-
munity structure not only reveals groups of harvesters that
have high behavioral similarity but also groups of spammers
who may be socially connected, due to the close relation
between harvesters and spammers. We provide an overview of
spectral clustering in Section III, and we discuss our choices
of behavioral similarity measures in Section IV.
Our main findings are as follows:
1) Most harvesters are either phishers or non-phishers
(Section II). We find that most harvesters either send
only phishing emails or no phishing emails at all (we
define what it means for a harvester to send an email in
Section II).
2) Phishers and non-phishers tend to separate into different
communities when clustering based on similarity in
spam server usage (Section V-A). That is, phishers tend
to associate with other phishers, and non-phishers tend to
associate with other non-phishers. In particular, phishers
appear in small communities with strong ties, which
suggests that they are sharing resources (spam servers)
with other members of their community.
3) Several groups of harvesters have coherent temporal
behavior and similar IP addresses (Section V-B). In
particular, we identify a group of ten harvesters that send
extremely large amounts of spam and have the same
/24 IP address prefix, which happens to be owned by a
rogue Internet service provider. This indicates that these
harvesters are either the same spammer or a group of
spammers operating from the same physical location.
These findings suggest that spammers do indeed form social
networks, and we are able to identify meaningful communities.
II. PROJECT HONEY POT
Project Honey Pot is a distributed system for monitoring
harvesting and spamming activity via a network of decoy
web pages with trap email addresses, known as honey pots.
These trap addresses are embedded within the HTML source
of a web page and are invisible to human visitors. Spammers
typically acquire email addresses either by browsing web sites
and looking for them or by running automated harvesting bots
that scan the HTML source of web pages and collect email
addresses automatically. Since the trap email addresses in the
honey pots are invisible to human visitors, Project Honey Pot
is trapping only the harvesting bots, and as a result, this is the
only type of harvester that we investigate in this paper.
Each time a harvester visits a honey pot, the centralized
Project Honey Pot server generates a unique trap email ad-
dress. The harvester’s IP address is recorded and sent to
the Project Honey Pot server. The email address embedded
into each honey pot is unique, so a particular email address
could only have been collected by the visitor to that particular
honey pot. Thus, when an email is received at one of the
trap addresses, we know exactly who acquired the address.
These email addresses are not published anywhere besides the
honey pot, so we can assume that all emails received at these
addresses are spam.
As of February 2009, over 35 million trap email addresses,
39 million spam servers, and 59, 000 harvesters have been
identified by Project Honey Pot [4]. Honey pots are located in
over 119 countries. The total number of emails received at the
trap email addresses monitored by Project Honey Pot is shown
by month in Fig. 2, starting from its inception in October 2004.
The number of emails received have been normalized by the
number of addresses collected to distinguish between growth
of Project Honey Pot and an increase in spam volume. October
2006 is a month of particular interest. Notice that the number
of emails received in October 2006 increased significantly
from September 2006 then came back down in November
2006. This observation agrees with media reports of a spam
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Fig. 2. Number of emails received by month per address collected.
outbreak in October 2006 [5]; thus we will focus our analysis
around this time. We refer readers to [3], [4] for additional
details on Project Honey Pot.
In order to discover social networks of spammers, we need
to associate emails to the spammers who sent them. Since we
do not know the identity of the spammer who sent a particular
email, we can associate the email either to the spam server that
was used to send it or to the harvester that acquired the recipi-
ent’s email address. A previous study using the Project Honey
Pot data set has suggested that the harvester is more likely to
be associated with the spammer than the spam server [3], so
we associate each email with the harvester that acquired the
recipient’s email address. In particular, this is different from
studies [1], [2], which did not involve harvesters and implicitly
associated emails with the spam servers that were used to
send them. Note that we are not assuming that the harvesters
are the spammers themselves. A harvester may collect email
addresses for multiple spammers, or a spammer may use
multiple harvesters to collect email addresses. Thus, when we
say that a particular harvester sends an email, we mean that a
spammer who obtained an address collected by this harvester
sends an email. To summarize, we are associating emails with
harvesters and trying to discover communities of harvesters,
which are closely related to communities of actual spammers.
As mentioned previously, Project Honey Pot is an ideal data
source for studying phishing emails because the trap email
addresses cannot sign up for accounts at financial institutions
and other sources that phishing emails fraudulently represent.
Note that this is not possible with legitimate email addresses,
which may receive legitimate emails from these sources. Since
we know that any email mentioning such a source is a phishing
email, we can classify each email as phishing or non-phishing
based on its content. We classify an email as phishing if its
subject contains a commonly used phishing word. The list of
such words was built using common phishing words such as
“password” and “account” and includes those found in a study
on phishing [6] and names of large financial institutions that
do business on-line such as PayPal and Chase.
In general we find that a small percentage of the spam
received through Project Honey Pot consists of phishing
emails. As of February 2009, 3.5% of the spam received was
phishing spam. We define a phishing level for each harvester
as the ratio of the number of phishing emails it sent to the total
number of emails it sent. An interesting finding is that most
harvesters either send only phishing emails or no phishing
emails at all. In particular, 14% of harvesters have a phishing
level of 0.9 or higher while 77% have a phishing level of 0.1
or lower, with only 9% of harvesters in between. Thus we
can label all harvesters as phishers or non-phishers based on
their phishing level. We label a harvester as a phisher if its
phishing level exceeds 0.5. As of February 2009, about 18% of
harvesters were labeled as phishers. We note that phishers send
less emails on a per-harvester basis than non-phishers, as only
3.5% of emails received were phishing emails as mentioned
earlier. The labeling of harvesters as phishers or non-phishers
will be used later when interpreting the clustering results.
III. OVERVIEW OF SPECTRAL CLUSTERING
In this paper, we employ spectral clustering to identify
groups of harvesters with high behavioral similarity. We
choose spectral clustering over other clustering techniques
because of its close relation to the graph partitioning problem
of minimizing the normalized cut between partitions, which is
a natural choice of objective function for community detection
as discussed in [7] where it is referred to as conductance.
A. The graph partitioning problem
We represent the network of harvesters by a weighted
undirected graph G = (V,E,W ) where V is the set of
vertices, representing harvesters; E is the set of edges between
vertices; and W = [wij ]Mi,j=1 is the matrix of edge weights
with wij indicating the similarity between harvesters i and j.
The choice of similarities is discussed in Section IV. W is the
adjacency matrix of the graph and is also referred to in the
literature as the similarity matrix or affinity matrix. M = |V |
is the total number of harvesters. The total weights of edges
between two sets of vertices A,B ⊂ V is defined by
links(A,B) =
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈B
wij , (1)
and the degree of a set A is defined by
deg(A) = links(A, V ). (2)
Our objective is to find highly similar groups of vertices
in the graph, which represent harvesters that behave in a
similar manner. This is a graph partitioning problem, and our
objective translates into minimizing similarity between groups,
maximizing similarity within groups, or preferably both. Let
the groups be denoted by V1, V2, . . . , VK where K denotes
the number of groups to partition the graph into. We represent
the graph partition by an M -by-K partition matrix X . Let
X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xK] where xij = 1 if harvester i is in
cluster j and xij = 0 otherwise. We adopt the normalized cut
disassociation measure proposed in [8]. One favorable property
of this measure is that minimizing the normalized cut between
groups simultaneously maximizes the normalized association
within groups. Thus we attempt to minimize the normalized
cut by maximizing the normalized association within groups,
which is defined by
KNassoc(X) =
1
K
K∑
i=1
links(Vi, Vi)
deg(Vi)
. (3)
B. Finding a near global-optimal solution
Unfortunately, maximizing KNassoc is NP-complete even
for K = 2 as noted in [8] so we turn to an approximate
method. Define the degree matrix D = diag(W1M ) where
diag(·) creates a diagonal matrix from its vector argument,
and 1M is a vector of M ones. Rewrite links and deg as
links(Vi, Vi) = xi
TWxi (4)
deg(Vi) = xi
TDxi. (5)
We can formulate the KNassoc maximization problem as
follows:
maximize KNassoc(X) = 1
K
K∑
i=1
xi
TWxi
xi
TDxi
(6)
subject to X ∈ {0, 1}M×K (7)
X1K = 1M . (8)
As mentioned earlier, finding the optimal partition matrix X
is an NP-complete problem. A near global-optimal solution
can be found by first relaxing a transformed version of X
into the continuous domain and finding the optimal continuous
partition matrix by solving a generalized eigenvalue problem.
This is followed by solving a discretization problem where
the closest discrete partition matrix to the optimal continuous
partition matrix is sought. We refer interested readers to [9]
for details on this method, commonly referred to as spectral
clustering.
C. Choosing the number of clusters
As with most clustering algorithms, the proper choice of
K , the number of clusters, is unknown in spectral clustering.
A useful heuristic particularly well-suited for choosing K in
spectral clustering problems is the eigengap heuristic. The goal
is to choose K such that the highest eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λK
of the adjacency matrix W are very close to 1 but λK+1 is
relatively far away from 1. This procedure was justified in [10]
and is used to choose K in this paper.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A social network is a social structure composed of nodes,
also known as actors, and ties, which indicate the relationships
between nodes. We cannot observe direct relationships be-
tween harvesters (the actors), so we use indirect relationships
as the ties. We explore two types of ties in this paper. Each
type of tie corresponds to a similarity measure for choosing
the edge weights wij , which indicate the behavioral similarity
between harvesters.
Note that the network may evolve over time so we need
to choose a time frame for analysis that is short enough so
that we should be able to see this evolution if it is present
yet long enough so that we have a large enough sample for
the clustering results to be meaningful. There is no clear-
cut method for choosing the time frame. As a starting point,
we split the data set by month and analyze each month
independently.
A. Similarity measures
In this paper, we study two measures of behavioral simi-
larity: similarity in spam server usage and temporal similarity.
For both of these similarity measures, we create a coincidence
matrix H as an intermediate step to the creation of the
adjacency matrix W , which is discussed in Section IV-B. The
choice of similarity measure is crucial because it determines
the topology of the graph. Each similarity measure provides
a different view of the social network, so a poor choice
of similarity measure may lead to detecting no community
structure if harvesters are too similar or too dissimilar.
1) Similarity in spam server usage: We note that harvesters
typically send emails through multiple spam servers so com-
mon usage of spam servers is one way to link harvesters.
Consider a mixed network of harvesters and spam servers
described by the M ×N coincidence matrix H = [hij ]M,Ni,j=1,
where M is the number of harvesters and N is the number
of spam servers. We choose hij = pij/ (djei) ∈ [0, 1] where
pij denotes the number of emails sent by harvester i using
spam server j, dj denotes the total number of emails sent (by
all harvesters) through spam server j, and ei denotes the total
number of email addresses harvester i has acquired. dj is a
normalization term that is included to account for the variation
in the total number of emails sent through each spam server.
For example, a harvester that sent four emails through a spam
server which only sent four emails total should indicate a much
stronger connection to that spam server than one that sent
four emails through a spam server which sent one thousand
emails total. ei is also a normalization term to account for
the variation in the number of email addresses each harvester
has acquired, based on the assumption that harvesters send an
equal amount of spam to each address they have acquired. We
can interpret hij as harvester i’s percentage of usage of spam
server j per address it has acquired. The similarity between
two harvesters i1 and i2 is the inner product between rows i1
and i2 of H .
2) Temporal similarity: Harvesters that exhibit high sim-
ilarity in their temporal behavior may also indicate a social
connection, so another possibility for linking harvesters is by
their temporal spamming behavior. We look at the timestamps
of all emails sent by a particular harvester and bin them
into 1-hour intervals, resulting in a vector indicating how
many emails a harvester sent in each interval. Doing this for
all of the harvesters, we get another coincidence matrix H
but with the columns representing time (in 1-hour intervals)
rather than spam servers. The entries of H are hij = sij/ei
where sij denotes the number of emails sent by harvester i
in the jth time interval, and ei is defined as before. Again
we normalize by the number of email addresses acquired but
no other normalizations are necessary because the columns
represent time, which does not vary for different harvesters.
B. Creating the adjacency matrix
From the coincidence matrix H we can obtain an un-
normalized matrix of pairwise similarities S = HHT . We
normalize S to form a normalized matrix of pairwise simi-
larities S′ = D−1/2S SD
−1/2
S , where DS is a diagonal matrix
consisting of the diagonal elements of S. We can interpret this
final normalization as a scaling of the edge weights between
harvesters such that each harvester’s self-edge has unit weight.
This ensures that each harvester is equally important because
we have no prior information on the importance of a particular
harvester in the network.
We create an adjacency matrix W describing the graph by
connecting the harvesters together according to their similari-
ties in S′. There are several methods of connecting the graph,
including k-nearest neighbors and the fully-connected graph.
We opt for the k-nearest neighbor method, which translates
into connecting each node to its neighbors with the k highest
similarities. This is the recommended choice in [10] and is less
vulnerable to improper choices of the connection parameters
(in this case, the value of k). It also results in a sparse
adjacency matrix, which speeds up computations and makes
the graph easier to visualize. Unfortunately, there are not many
guidelines on how to choose k. A heuristic suggested in [10],
motivated by asymptotic results, is to choose k = logM . We
use this choice of k as a starting point and increase k as
necessary to avoid artificially disconnecting the graph.
V. RESULTS
We present visualizations for our clustering results from
October 2006, which is a month of particular interest as
noted in Section II. The visualizations were created using the
force-directed layout in Cytoscape [11]. Key statistics of the
clustering results over a period of one year starting in July
2006 are presented in 3-month intervals in tables.
A. Similarity in spam server usage
The graph created using similarity in spam server usage
usually consists of a large connected component and many
small connected components. The small components are easily
recognized as clusters, while the large component is divided
into multiple clusters. In Fig. 3 we show the social network of
harvesters, connected using similarity in spam server usage,
from October 2006. The shape and color of a harvester
indicates the cluster it belongs to. The eigengap heuristic
suggests that the large connected component should be divided
into 64 clusters, but to make the figure easier to interpret, we
present a clustering result that divides the large component
into 7 clusters. We also remove connected components of
less than ten harvesters. These modifications were made for
visualization purposes only. In our analysis, and in particular
when calculating the validation indices we present later, we
use the number of clusters suggested by the eigengap heuristic
and include all small connected components.
Notice that the majority of harvesters belong in a large clus-
ter with weak ties, which is a subset of the large component.
Meanwhile there exist several smaller clusters with strong ties,
some of which are connected to the large cluster. Each cluster
represents a community of harvesters that happen to use the
Fig. 3. Social network of harvesters formed by similarity in spam server
usage in October 2006 (best viewed in color). The color and shape of a
harvester indicate the cluster it belongs to.
Phishing level0.0 1.0
Fig. 4. Alternate view of social network pictured in Fig. 3, where the color
of a harvester corresponds to its phishing level.
same resources (spam servers), indicating that there is a strong
likelihood that these harvesters are working together.
As with any clustering problem, the results need to be
validated. If common usage of spam servers indeed indicates
social connections between harvesters, perhaps we can find
some other property that is consistent within clusters. Recall
from Section II that harvesters can be classified as either
phishers or non-phishers. In Fig. 4 we show the same social
network colored by phishing level, as defined in Section II,
rather than cluster. Note that each of the clusters consists
almost entirely of phishers or almost entirely of non-phishers.
In particular, phishers appear to concentrate in small clusters
with strong ties. This observation is further enhanced when
clustering using 64 clusters as suggested by the eigengap
heuristic. Thus, phishing level appears to be consistent within
clusters. We consider a cluster as a phishing cluster if it
contains more phishers than non-phishers and as a non-
phishing cluster otherwise.
Using phisher or non-phisher as a label for each harvester,
we compute the Rand index and adjusted Rand index [12],
both commonly used indices used for clustering validation.
The Rand index is a measure of agreement between clustering
results and a set of class labels and is given by
Rand index = a+ d
a+ b+ c+ d
(9)
where a is the number of pairs of nodes with the same label
TABLE I
VALIDATION INDICES FOR CLUSTERING RESULTS
Year 2006 2007
Month July October January April July
Rand index 0.923 0.954 0.942 0.964 0.901
Adj. Rand index 0.821 0.871 0.810 0.809 0.649
and in the same cluster, b is the number of pairs with the same
label but in different clusters, c is the number of pairs with
different labels but in the same cluster, and d is the number
of pairs with different labels and in different clusters. A Rand
index of 0 indicates complete disagreement between clusters
and labels, and a Rand index of 1 indicates perfect agreement.
The adjusted Rand index is corrected for chance so that the
range is [−1, 1] with an expected index of 0 for a random
clustering result.
In this clustering problem, the Rand index indicates how
well phishers and non-phishers divide into phishing and non-
phishing clusters, respectively. The adjusted Rand index indi-
cates how well phishers and non-phishers divide compared to
the expected division that a random clustering algorithm would
produce. Both indices are shown in Table I for five months.
Note that the clustering results have excellent agreement with
the labels, and the agreement is much higher than expected
by chance. The division between phishers and non-phishers
is not perfect, as there are some phishers belonging in non-
phishing clusters and vice-versa, but the high adjusted Rand
index indicates that this split is highly unlikely to be due to
chance alone. Hence we have found empirical evidence that
phishers tend to form small communities with strong ties,
suggesting that they share resources (spam servers) between
members of their community.
B. Temporal similarity
Unlike the graph created by similarity in spam server usage,
the graph created by temporal similarity is usually connected.
In Fig. 5 we show the social network of harvesters, connected
using temporal similarity, from October 2006, where again the
shape and color of a harvester indicates the cluster it belongs
to. Any similarity in color with Fig. 3 is coincidental; Fig. 5
represents a completely different view of the social network
and provides different insights.
Unfortunately we do not have validation for this clustering
result on a global scale like we did with phishing level
for similarity in spam server usage. However by looking at
temporal spamming plots of the small clusters, we find some
local validation. Namely, we see groups of harvesters in the
same cluster with extremely coherent temporal spamming be-
havior. We notice that in many of these groups, the harvesters
also have similar IP addresses. In particular, we notice a
group of ten harvesters that have extremely coherent temporal
spamming patterns and have the same /24 IP address prefix,
namely 208.66.195/24, indicating that they are also in the same
physical location. In Fig. 5 they can be found in the light green
cluster of triangular nodes at the top right of the network.
Fig. 5. Social network of harvesters formed by temporal similarity in October
2006 (best viewed in color). The color and shape of a harvester indicate the
cluster it belongs to.
TABLE II
AVERAGE TEMPORAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF 208.66.195/24
GROUP OF TEN HARVESTERS
Year 2006 2007
Month July October January April July
ρavg 0.980 0.988 0.950 0.949 0.935
Upon further investigation, we find that their IP addresses
are in the 208.66.192/22 prefix owned by McColo Corp., a
known rogue Internet service provider that acted as a gateway
to spammers and was finally removed from the Internet in
November 2008 [13]. This serves as further confirmation that
these harvesters are likely to be socially connected. They first
appeared at the end of May 2006 and have been among the
heaviest harvesters, in terms of the number of emails sent, in
every month since then. The average correlation coefficients
ρavg between two harvesters in this group are listed in Table
II for five months. Notice that their average correlation co-
efficients are extremely high and strongly suggest that they
are working together in a coordinated matter. Also note that
their behavior is still highly correlated more than a year after
they first appeared. Furthermore, we discover that they have
high temporal correlation in the harvesting phase; that is, they
collect email addresses in a very similar manner as well. We
would certainly expect them to belong to the same cluster,
which agrees with the clustering results. Hence we believe
that this group is either the same spammer or a community of
spammers operating from the same physical location.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we revealed social networks of spammers
by discovering communities of harvesters from the data col-
lected through Project Honey Pot. Specifically, we clustered
harvesters using two similarity measures reflecting their be-
havioral correlations. In addition, we studied the distribution
of phishing emails among harvesters and among clusters. We
found that harvesters typically send either only phishing emails
or no phishing emails at all. Moreover, we discovered that
communities of harvesters divide into communities of mostly
phishers and mostly non-phishers when clustering according
to similarity in spam server usage. In particular, we observed
that phishers tend to form small communities with strong
ties. We also discovered several groups of harvesters with
extremely coherent temporal behavior and very similar IP
addresses, indicating that these groups are close geographically
in addition to socially.
Note that the two similarity measures we studied provided
us with different views of the social networks of harvesters,
and we gained useful insights from both of them. All of our
findings are empirical; however, we believe that they reveal
some previously unknown behavior of spammers, namely that
spammers do indeed form social networks. Since harvesters
are closely related to spammers, the discovered communities
of harvesters are closely related to communities of spammers.
If we further hypothesize that harvesters are the spammers
themselves, then the discovered communities of harvesters
correspond exactly to communities of spammers. Identifying
communities of spammers allows us to fight spam from a new
perspective—by using spammers’ social structure.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Matthew Prince, Eric Langheinrich, and Lee
Holloway of Unspam Technologies Inc. for providing us with
the Project Honey Pot data set. We are also grateful to Nitin
Nayar, John Bell, and Dr. Olaf Maennel for their assistance
with the data retrieval. This research was partially supported by
the Office of Naval Research grant N00014-08-1-1065 and the
National Science Foundation grant CCR-0325571. Kevin Xu
was supported in part by an award from the Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Ramachandran and N. Feamster, “Understanding the network-level
behavior of spammers,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Sep. 2006.
[2] Z. Duan, K. Gopalan, and X. Yuan, “Behavioral characteristics of
spammers and their network reachability properties,” in Proc. Int. Conf.
Communications, Jun. 2007.
[3] M. Prince, L. Holloway, E. Langheinrich, B. M. Dahl, and A. M. Keller,
“Understanding how spammers steal your e-mail address: An analysis
of the first six months of data from Project Honey Pot,” in Proc. 2nd
Conf. Email and Anti-Spam, Jul. 2005.
[4] (2009) Project Honey Pot. [Online]. Available:
http://www.projecthoneypot.org
[5] M. Austin. (2006, Nov.) Spam at epic levels. ITPro. [Online]. Available:
http://www.itpro.co.uk/97589/spam-at-epic-levels
[6] M. Chandrasekaran, K. Narayanan, and S. Upadhyaya, “Phishing email
detection based on structural properties,” in Proc. 9th Annual NYS Cyber
Security Conf., Jun. 2006.
[7] J. Leskovec, K. J. Lang, A. Dasgupta, and M. W. Mahoney, “Statistical
properties of community structure in large social and information
networks,” in 17th Int. WWW, Apr. 2008, pp. 695–704.
[8] J. Shi and J. Malik, “Normalized cuts and image segmentation,” IEEE
Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., vol. 22, pp. 888–905, Aug. 2000.
[9] S. Yu and J. Shi, “Multiclass spectral clustering,” in Proc. 9th IEEE Int.
Conf. Computer Vision, Oct. 2003.
[10] U. von Luxburg, “A tutorial on spectral clustering,” Statistics and
Computing, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 395–416, Aug. 2007.
[11] P. Shannon, A. Markiel, O. Ozier, N. S. Baliga, J. T. Wang, D. Ramage,
N. Amin, B. Schwikowski, and T. Ideker, “Cytoscape: A software en-
vironment for integrated models of biomolecular interaction networks,”
Genome Research, vol. 13, pp. 2498–2504, Nov. 2003.
[12] L. Hubert and P. Arabie, “Comparing partitions,” J. Classification, vol. 2,
no. 1, pp. 193–218, Dec. 1985.
[13] J. Nazario. (2008, Nov.) Third “bad ISP” disappears–
McColo gone. Arbor Networks. [Online]. Available:
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/11/third-bad-isp-dissolves-mccolo-gone/
